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Rabat - Algeria is currently facing some major security concerns. French tourist Hervé Gourdel was recently abducted and decapitated in the Kabylie area by a new local offshoot of the Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant (ISIL) known as Jound al-Khalifa (The Soldiers of the Caliph).
This group has, dutifully, expressed allegiance, in the traditional Islamic way, to the self-proclaimed Caliph of ISIL: Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi. This clearly shows that the Algerian military has been unable to clean up the Kabylie Mountains of the remnants of terrorist elements and other related radical groups after over two decades of military operations. These operations involved thousands of soldiers trained in hunting in terrorists and equipped with the most advanced weaponry designed for this particular mission.
This leads us to ask two vitally important questions:1- Is the powerful Algerian army, ANP (Armée nationale populaire), which experts consider to be one of the best equipped in Africa, only powerful on paper? Or is it, perhaps, that fighting their Muslim brethren does not motivate the troops? If this the case, then this is a case of pure insubordination, which means that the army has a discipline problem. Or even worse, it could be that some high-ranking officers are either sympathizing with the radicals or don't like the army's current handling of internal affairs.
2- This abduction of a foreigner in a highly militarized and highly policed country shows that possibly the army, which is the power behind the throne, is deeply occupied in something else and is overlooking important security issues.
All in all, as Shakespeare said in Hamlet: "Something is rotten in in the state of Danemark" (Hamlet (1.4), Marcellus to Horatio).
Indeed, in less than two years, two major security breaches have occurred in Algeria. The first was the Tiguentourine gas facility near In Amenas. On January 16, 2013, the facility was captured by the notorious radical Salafist Mokhtar Belmokhtar, known as “Mr. Marlboro”, for his illegal traffic in cigarette contraband business in the Sahara desert, and for his links with al-Qaeda.
The attack on the Tiguentourine gas facility was planned by the infamous Belmokhtar and executed by his lieutenant, Abdul al Nigeri. After a four-day siege, Algerian Special Forces raided the facility. During the raid, 39 hostages were killed, along with a security guard. Many European countries whose hostages were killed believed that whole episode was a botched military rescue operation and showed lack of professionalism on the part of the army, or, more precisely, the infamous and over-powerful DRS (Department of Intelligence and Security).
Dalia Ghanem-Yazbeck[i] questions the DRS’s capabilities in the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace’s electronic journal:
Yet over the past year, the institution, namely its aging generals, have come under criticism after the botched response to the attack on the gas complex in Tiguentourine near In Amenas on January 16, 2013. Prior incidents also called in question the management of the military and DRS, including the kidnapping of three European NGO members in the refugee camp of Tindouf on October 24, 2011, terrorist attacks by the Movement for Unity and Jihad in West Africa (MUJAO) against the territorial branch of the National Gendarmerie of Tamanrasset on March 3, 2012, and the abduction of seven Algerian diplomats in Gao on April 5, 2012. More recent attacks on the police station in Ouargla on June 24, 2012 highlighted the failures of DRS leaders, and rendered it important for the army itself to take some action ; this provided the impetus for September’s dismissals.
Maybe, in the end, these countries were hard on the Algerian Government because none of them were informed or consulted prior to the launch of the operation. It must be pointed out, however, that the Algerian officials are extremely culturally sensitive to their independence of decision and initiative. For them, the operation was a question of manhood and personal pride (nif). Foreigners, friends, or foes have to mind their own business when it comes to Algerian internal affairs.
Since the latest terrorist attack, Algeria has been kind of paralyzed. The head of state, President Bouteflika, has been in power for 15 years. The country owes the President for the “Charter for Peace and National Reconciliation,” which ended the civil war. Thanks to this pact, the terrorists, with “no blood on their hands,” benefited from a complete amnesty for laying down their arms and returning to civil life.
The pact brought peace and normalcy to Algeria, but in the mountains and the Sahara the radical Islamists operatives remained active. In January 2007, a new terrorist group expressed allegiance to the nebulous al-Qaeda organization. This group called itself al-Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM.) AQIM grew out of the Algerian radical Salafist group known as the Salafist Group for Preaching and Combat (GSPC), which was founded by Hassan Hattab.
This shows that there are still many dangerous terrorists in the mountainous areas of Algeria. Worse than that, these terrorists have porous allegiances and can easily switch to the side of the most dangerous Islamist groups, such as ISIL. Jound al-khalifa isnot only unhappy with the government. Their hatred of the government dates back to 1992. They also cannot stand their own several groups that exist either in the north or the south of Algeria.
This quick and clean hit-and-run operation undertaken by this ISIL cell shows that the DRS is truly questionable in many ways. The DRS was created in 1958, prior to Algeria’s independence, as the Ministry of Ammunition and Connections.
After the departure of the French, it became the pivotal center of the country, close to the presidency, with eyes and ears everywhere. Its mission was, and certainly still is today, more than ever, to protect the state and the government. The DRS was founded to protect the ruling class of generals and politicians and their riches, which they derive from oil revenues. They believe they are the ones, who, through FLN (Front de Libération National), fought and gained independence, and thus should be the legitimate source of power and wealth in the country.
For John R. Schindler, the secretive and powerful DRS is a very suspicious and multi-faceted organization:
Algeria, like Pakistan, has a military intelligence service, the Department of Intelligence and Security (DRS), whose remit far surpasses any Western security agency. The DRS is rightly seen as the regime’s backbone, with a powerbase beyond even the military. In a real sense, as in Pakistan, the military’s spies control much of the political system, functioning as a law unto themselves, committing human rights abuses and providing clandestine support for terrorist groups to further the service’s interests.
So why is it that the omnipresent DRS did not sense the danger coming from the Algerian wing of ISIL? The answer is a two-faceted hypothesis: the DRS knew, but did not want to do anything:
First facet of the hypothesis:
DRS sensed the danger, but did nothing to stop it, in order to show the world that wants democracy in Algeria that this country cannot be ruled by democratically right now. They want to demonstrate that Algeria needs a strong army to protect it from the Islamists, like in 1992 when the FIS won the first half of the elections and prepared to take power, and;
Second facet of the hypothesis:
Recently, Bouteflika has been flown to Switzerland for medical attention and care, according to the Algerian opposition in Paris. Apparently, he is terminally ill and the army is looking for a new president and front man. General Mohamed Lamine Mediene, nicknamed Taoufik, is both powerful and ambitious and is looking forward to assuming this post. He wishes to be President of Algeria with the powerful DRS at his service, so he can intimidate the people and potential opponents. General Mediene is not the only hopeful for this post but he is, certainly, the best placed for the position.
The views expressed in this article are the author’s own and do not necessarily reflect Morocco World News’ editorial policy
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